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ABSTRACT
Over the past five years we have witnessed the introduction
of DNSSEC, a security extension to the DNS that relies on
digital signatures. DNSSEC strengthens DNS by preventing
attacks such as cache poisoning. However, a common argu-
ment against the deployment of DNSSEC is its potential
for abuse in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks,
in particular reflection and amplification attacks. DNS re-
sponses for a DNSSEC-signed domain are typically larger
than those for an unsigned domain, thus, it may seem that
DNSSEC could actually worsen the problem of DNS-based
DDoS attacks. The potential for abuse in DNSSEC-signed
domains has, however, never been assessed on a large scale.
In this paper we establish ground truth around this open
question. We perform a detailed measurement on a large
dataset of DNSSEC-signed domains, covering 70% (2.5 mil-
lion) of all signed domains in operation today, and compare
the potential for amplification attacks to a representative
sample of domains without DNSSEC. At first glance, the
outcome of these measurements confirms that DNSSEC in-
deed worsens the DDoS phenomenon. Closer examination,
however, gives a more nuanced picture. DNSSEC really
only makes the situation worse for one particular query type
(ANY), for which responses may be over 50 times larger than
the original query (and in rare cases up to 179×). We also
discuss a number of mitigation strategies that can have im-
mediate impact for operators and suggest future research
directions with regards to these mitigation strategies.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Miscella-
neous; C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Measurement Tech-
niques
Keywords
DNS; DNSSEC; DDoS; amplification attack; reflection at-
tack; measurements; denial-of-service; attack
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since they were first seen at scale at the turn of the cen-
tury [1], Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have
become one of the biggest threats to the Internet’s security
and stability. The scale of DDoS attacks keeps growing; the
“biggest DDoS ever”of 300 Gbit/s in early 20131 has already
been surpassed this year by an attack that was 25% larger
in volume2.
These large volume attacks usually rely on the same ba-
sic principles. First, they use spoofing. Spoofing allows the
attacker to falsify the source IP in a request to some net-
work service, resulting in the response to this request being
sent to the falsified source IP (this is known as reflection).
Second, attackers leverage amplification, the principle that
some network protocols return a large answer to a relatively
small request. Amplification is of particular interest to an
attacker since a small investment in attack traffic results in
large attack volumes.
A commonly used DDoS attack is DNS amplification (as
e.g. Arbor Networks’ annual security report [2] shows). As
the name suggests, this attack relies on bandwidth amplifica-
tion using the DNS protocol, where amplification is defined
as response size
query size
. Typical DNS requests are in the order of
magnitude of 20−60 bytes in size. The classic DNS protocol
[3] limits responses to at most 512 bytes; assuming a request
size of 40 bytes this already yields an amplification factor of
512
40
≈ 12.8. More recent extensions to DNS that allow for
larger responses easily result in amplification factors of 100
or more.
Over the past six years, since Dan Kaminsky disclosed a
serious vulnerability in the DNS protocol [4], a major over-
haul of the DNS has been underway: the introduction of
the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) protocol. This de-
ployment is now bearing fruit; where in 2008 there were a
handful of DNSSEC-signed domains, the total number now
tops 3.5 million3. One of the key features of the DNSSEC
protocol is the introduction of digital signatures in DNS re-
sponses. Consequently, the size of DNS responses increases.
Many experts consider this a major drawback of DNSSEC
(e.g. Cowperthwaite & Somayaji [5]) and noted opponents
of DNSSEC cite this as one of the reasons why they feel
DNSSEC should not be used (e.g. Bernstein [6]).
Although the DDoS potential keeps coming up time and
again in discussions about DNSSEC, very little ground truth
1http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-21954636
2http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26136774
3based on statistical sources listed at http://www.
internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/statistics/
exists about the actual DDoS potential of the millions of
DNSSEC-signed domains that are online today. This leads
us to the main question we will answer in this paper: How
bad is DNSSEC really?
Contribution.
In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive measure-
ment of the DDoS potential of DNSSEC. Our measurements
encompass 70% of all DNSSEC-signed domains in operation
today and is based on data from six major top-level domains
(TLDs) each with a significant number (> 10K) of signed
domains. We compare the DDoS potential of DNSSEC-
signed domains to a representative sample of domains with-
out DNSSEC. Analysis of our measurements shows that the
average amplification of DNSSEC exceeds that of regular
DNS many times (by a factor of 6× - 12×). At first glance,
this is worrying. Looking deeper, however, it becomes ev-
ident that extreme amplification only occurs for a certain
type of query (ANY) that is often abused for amplification at-
tacks. For “normal” DNS queries, the picture is much more
nuanced and does not warrant some claims that DNSSEC
should not be deployed [5, 6]. Next to that, a number of
measures can be taken to dampen the DDoS potential of
DNSSEC significantly, although further work in this area is
required.
To encourage further study we make the data collected
for our measurements available as open data to the Internet
measurement community (see Sec. 8).
Organization of this paper.
This paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 provides back-
ground material on DNS amplification as an attack method.
Sec. 3 describes our methodology and measurement setup.
In Sec. 4 we discuss the data sets collected during our mea-
surements. Sec. 5 gives a detailed analysis of the data we
obtained. Sec. 6 provides an overview of current counter-
measures based on the literature and calls for the introduc-
tion of additional countermeasures. We discuss related work
in Sec. 7. Finally, we draw conclusions and suggest future
research directions in Sec. 8.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 DNS amplification: a brief primer
2.1.1 Attacks using open resolvers
Fig. 1 shows how DNS amplification attacks work. At-
tacks are initiated from a swarm of machines (left-hand side
of the figure) under the control of the attacker. The attacker
uses this swarm to send large numbers of DNS queries in
which the sender IP address is spoofed to be the victim’s
IP address (bottom middle of the figure). Queries are sent
À to so-called open DNS resolvers. These are misconfigured
DNS resolvers that do not restrict which clients are allowed
to send them queries. In turn, the open resolvers will – if
the query result is not cached – contact the appropriate au-
thoritative DNS servers Á to resolve the query. Finally, the
open resolvers will send the responses Â to the victim. In
general, the queries À are small whereas the responses Â are
large, hence achieving amplification.
Unfortunately, open resolvers are plentiful on the Internet.
Ku¨hrer et al. [7] report observing between 23 and 25.5 mil-
lion open resolvers during weekly Internet-wide scans over a
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Figure 1: DNS amplification attack
period of 4 months between November 2013 and February
2014. This makes this attack easy to carry out and thus
attractive for attackers.
2.1.2 DNS extensions (EDNS0)
Typically, the goal of an attacker is to achieve a high
amplification factor. This gives him the best return on in-
vestment where he only needs to generate a small amount
of traffic for a large attack. With the introduction of the
EDNS0 extension [8] larger DNS responses (than the origi-
nal 512 bytes) become possible. EDNS0 allows clients and
servers to specify the maximum response size they support.
Fig. 2 shows whether clients to one of SURFnet’s4 authori-
tative name servers use EDNS0. As the figure shows, about
two thirds of clients use EDNS0; earlier research (e.g. [9])
shows that this figure is similar for other name servers across
the Internet. The prevalent configuration for EDNS0 is to
set the maximum response size to approximately 4Kbytes.
Fig. 3 shows the maximum response size reported by clients
of the same name server as in Fig. 2, with around 90% ad-
vertising a size over 4000 bytes. Again, this matches earlier
results reported by Kreibich et al. [9].
4The National Research and Education Network in
the Netherlands, http://www.surf.nl/en/about-surf/
subsidiaries/surfnet
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Figure 2: EDNS0 use for ns1.surfnet.nl
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Figure 3: Advertised EDNS0 maximum response
size for ns1.surfnet.nl
In theory, given a query size of 40 bytes, an amplification
of 4096
40
≈ 102.4 is achievable. Table 1 gives some examples
of the theoretical attack volumes that can be achieved if the
attacker generates 100Mbit/s in queries for various amplifi-
cation factors.
Q-size R-size Ampl. Attacker Victim
(bytes) (bytes) (factor) (bits/s) (bits/s)
40 512 12.8 100M 1.28G
40 1472 36.8 100M 3.68G
40 4096 102.4 100M 10.24G
Table 1: Theoretical effect of DNS amplification
As the table shows, when using EDNS0’s expanded maxi-
mum response size, significant attack results can be achieved
with a relatively small investment in bandwidth on the side
of the attacker.
2.1.3 Crafted domains
Also of interest is how attackers select the DNS query to
use in the attack. One current practice is that attackers craft
special domains for which certain DNS queries are guaran-
teed to return large responses. Vaughn & Evron [10], for
instance, analyse a case where an attacker crafted a domain
with a large TXT record that guaranteed a large response to
certain queries. A particularly interesting query type for at-
tackers to abuse is the ANY query; when faced with such a
query, name servers are supposed to return all record types
for the name specified in the query. In practice, a combina-
tion of both a crafted domain as well as the use of ANY queries
are often observed. In our own research group, as part of an-
other project in which we are investigating “DDoS-for-hire”
services [11] we have observed a number of DNS amplifica-
tion attacks, most of which used EDNS0, ANY queries and
crafted domains.
2.2 Benefits DNSSEC offers to the attacker
There are a number of “hinderances” for attackers given
the attack methodology described in the previous subsec-
tions:
• bandwidth on the open resolvers that are abused for
the attack may be scarce (for instance because the
open resolver is on a DSL CPE device), necessitating
the use of large numbers of amplifiers;
• creating crafted domains makes the attacker vulner-
able to prosecution since domain registrations can –
sometimes – be traced back to the attacker;
• crafted domains may be taken down when discovered;
• filtering of responses for crafted domains can be a pos-
sible mitigation strategy for victims.
DNSSEC-signed domains offer an attractive alternative
to attackers since they help avoid the hinderances described
above. Given the high number of signed domains, it gets
more interesting to directly abuse authoritative name servers
for DNSSEC-signed domains, instead of open resolvers; it
is more likely that authoritative name servers have suffi-
cient bandwidth available than e.g. open resolvers on DSL
CPE devices. Also, instead of crafting a dedicated domain,
attackers can now choose from a wide range of DNSSEC-
signed domains for which the answers to e.g. ANY queries are
most likely quite large due to the inclusion of DNSSEC key
material and signatures. This makes attackers less vulner-
able to discovery, prosecution and take-down of the crafted
domains. Finally, DNS responses for legitimate DNSSEC-
signed domains are much harder to filter since filtering is
likely to also impact legitimate queries and responses.
These benefits to attackers underline the necessity of es-
tablishing ground truth about the actual DDoS potential of
the already large and growing number of DNSSEC-signed
domains. With this data in hand, it becomes possible to
develop targeted strategies to address this potentially dan-
gerous side effect of deploying DNSSEC.
The importance of studying this topic now is also em-
phasised by the fact that there have already been attacks
that abuse DNSSEC-signed domains for amplification. In
mid-2012 many organizations across the Internet saw their
DNSSEC-signed domains being abused directly on author-
itative name servers for amplification attacks. Documen-
tation about these attacks is, unfortunately, not available
as they were mainly discussed in private by large opera-
tors, on mailing lists and at meetings such as RIPE and the
IETF. The lead author of this paper, however, was involved
in many of these discussions. An indirect discussion of these
attacks was written up by Cisco in their security blog5.
We note that the DNS and DNSSEC community (con-
sisting of network engineers, DNS software developers and
organisations concerned with online security) has already
started to take steps to mitigate the dangers of DNSSEC-
based amplification attacks by introducing Response Rate
Limiting (RRL), which is discussed in Sec. 6.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 High-level goals
Our high-level goal, as stated in Sec. 1, is to gauge the
DDoS potential of DNSSEC-signed domains in comparison
to unsigned domains. In order to achieve this goal, we per-
form a large scale measurement of all DNSSEC-signed do-
mains in six top-level domains (TLDs) that have large num-
bers of signed domains. We compare these against a repre-
sentative sample of unsigned domains in the same TLDs.
5Case study 2 in http://blogs.cisco.com/security/
real-world-dns-abuse-finding-common-ground/
3.2 Acceptable upper limit for amplification
An important question to ask – and one that is difficult
to answer – is what is an acceptable upper limit on the
amplification possible for a particular domain on a particular
server. The simple answer is that any amplification is bad,
but such an answer is too simple, since the DNS protocol
already inherently has some amplification effect.
As we outlined in the previous section, EDNS0 vastly in-
creases the amplification potential in DNS. Since – other
than combating open resolvers – no large scale action has
been taken to reduce the amplification potential in pre-
EDNS0 classic DNS, we take the maximum amplification
achievable using classic DNS as an upper limit. We calcu-
late6 this maximum achievable amplification by 1) assuming
a query for the shortest name in a domain (e.g. “x.com”),
which will consequently result in the smallest query and 2)
a response that uses the maximum allowed size for regular
DNS (512 bytes). For our example (x.com) this yields an
amplification of response size
query size
= 512
23
≈ 22.3.
3.3 Query types
We selected a number of queries to perform for each do-
main. These queries are specified below, together with a
rationale for why we selected this particular query type:
• ANY – as explained in Sec. 2.1.2 this query results in the
largest possible response since it includes all resource
records for the queried name.
• MX – returns the names of mail exchangers for the do-
main; domains usually have more than one mail ex-
changer hence the answer to this query may be rela-
tively large.
• NS – returns all authoritative name servers for a do-
main; again, domains usually have more than one au-
thoritative name server, thus the answer to this query
may also be relatively large.
• A – returns the IPv4 address(es) for the queried name
and is typically the most common DNS query per-
formed for a domain.
• AAAA – returns the IPv6 address(es) for the queried
name and is another common query type since most
modern software will look for both the IPv4 and the
IPv6 address of a host.
• TXT – returns textual information for the queried name;
this can, for instance, be information about mail han-
dling for the domain (used by spam filters). Addition-
ally, as mentioned in Sec. 2.1.3 this query type is some-
times used by attackers in domains especially crafted
for amplification attacks.
For the latter three query types (A, AAAA and TXT) we
perform multiple queries. One for the so-called apex record
(denoted by @), one for the name www under the domain and
one for the name mail. We expect that at least one of these
names exists in most domains.
6Note that this is not just a theoretical value; analysis
of our measurements shows that each measured TLD has
a non-negligible number of domains that meet this pattern
(small query, maximum size response) when queried using
classic DNS.
For DNSSEC-signed domains we also measure the answer
to two DNSSEC-specific query types:
• DNSKEY – returns the set of public keys required to
validate signatures in a domain. The answer is usually
large as there is often more than one key and individual
key records are large as RSA keys of sizes 1024- and
2048-bits are commonly used (as suggested in [12] and
because these are default values for many DNSSEC
implementations).
• NSEC(3) – this is not a query type as such, but is the
record type that is returned when the queried name
does not exist; NSEC(3) is also known as authenticated
denial of existence and proves with a digital signature
that the queried name does not exist. Especially re-
sponses of the newer variant NSEC3 are likely to be
quite large.
Each individual query is performed once using classic DNS
and once using EDNS0 with the EDNS0 maximum response
size set to 327687. For DNSSEC-signed domains we also
perform the query with EDNS0 and the DNSSEC OK (DO)
flag set to true, to get DNSSEC-signed responses.
3.4 Metrics
The metrics we record for each query are:
• the query size (DNS UDP datagram size);
• the response size (DNS UDP datagram size, possibly
reassembled from multiple UDP fragments);
• the amplification factor (defined as response size
query size
);
• the EDNS0 maximum response size reported by the
authoritative name server (puts an upper bound on
the maximum amplification that can be achieved using
this particular name server);
• whether or not the response was truncated (this indi-
cates that the authoritative name server was unable or
unwilling to return all requested data in the response),
and indicates that the querying host should fall back
to TCP to get the full response;
• the number of answers in the response;
• the number of authority records in the response (in
most responses including this information is optional
and indicates which name servers are authoritative for
the queried name);
• the number of additional records in the response (these
optional records can for instance specify IP addresses
for name servers included in the authority section);
• the number of distinct resource record types in the
response.
7We chose this value to also register results that exceed
the commonly used maximum response size of 4KB; we de-
cided not to use the maximum value (65535) since we did
not want to risk running into possible boundary conditions
in DNS software implementations.
To ensure that we are not inadvertently including domains
of one kind in the other data set, we check for each domain
whether it is DNSSEC-signed or not (by checking the pres-
ence of DNSKEY records). If the domain turns out to belong
to another category than expected, we exclude this domain
from the measurement. Equally, those domains for which
we are unable to determine the set of authoritative name
servers or for which none of the authoritative name servers
responds to queries are excluded from the data sets. We note
that, for reasons of efficiency, we attempt each query only
once, since authoritative name servers are generally always
online.
3.5 Measurement software
To perform the measurements we developed two appli-
cations. The first is a zone file parser, which given the
size of the DNS zones for TLDs, we needed specially tai-
lored software for. The parser application is able to extract
DNSSEC secure delegations, i.e. DNS delegations for which
a DNSSEC chain of trust is established by including one or
more DS records in the TLD (see Sec. 5 of [13]). It is also
able to extract regular domains from the zone. The parser
stores the extracted domain names in a SQLite database.
Optionally, the application can take a random sample of do-
mains.
The second application is a scanner application. This ap-
plication operates on the database created by the zone file
parser and for each domain in the database will perform the
queries outlined in Sec. 3.4. The application is massively
parallel and launches several hundreds of threads to per-
form the scan. Scanning takes place in two phases. In phase
one, the application determines the set of authoritative name
servers for each domain in the database and the correspond-
ing IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for these name servers. In phase
two, the application sends the queries described in Sec. 3.4
to each individual IP address for each name server of each
domain. After each set of queries to a single IP address, the
domain is placed back at the end of the queue until no more
IP addresses remain for the domain to be scanned in which
case it is marked as completed. This design choice ensures
that no excessive amounts of queries for a single domain are
sent in bursts while keeping the amount of state the scanner
needs to maintain manageable. We found that this strategy
strikes an optimal balance between the load imposed on the
scanning system as well as the scanned systems.
Both applications make extensive use of the LDNS library
by NLnet Labs8, a popular software package that provides
a comprehensive set of DNS-related functions.
Note that the SQLite database schema was designed such
that the data can easily be anonymized. This was done on
purpose because the resulting data sets will be shared as
open data with the research community.
3.6 Ethical considerations
As mentioned in the previous section, we took particu-
lar care to ensure that our measurements do not impose an
undue burden on authoritative name servers we scan. To
this end we made deliberate design choices as discussed in
Sec. 3.5. In addition to this, we monitored our experiment
while it was running to check if the design worked as fore-
seen. Additionally, we only performed legitimate queries
8http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
that are expected to be part of day-to-day traffic to author-
itative name servers.
With respect to the data sets for the TLDs we used, we
obtained these through specific processes established by the
TLD operator or under a specific contract with individual
TLDs. In both cases, we took care to inform the TLDs
about the purpose for which we were going to use the data
and obtained their consent.
4. DATA SETS
4.1 Source data
TLD Data obtained #domains #DNSSEC
.com Full zone 113.1M 326.5k (0.3%)
.net Full zone 15.2M 69.5k (0.5%)
.org Full zone 10.3M 37.6k (0.4%)
.nl Selection 5.4M 1696.1k (31.2%)
.se Full zone 1.4M 334.9k (24.8%)
.uk Selection 10.6M 10.2k (0.1%)
Table 2: Overview of source data
We obtained data covering 70% of all 3.5 million DNSSEC-
signed domains from six different top-level domains. Tab. 2
lists the TLDs from which we obtained data. The table lists
the type of data obtained (either the full zone or a selec-
tion containing all secure delegations and a random sample
of unsigned domains), the total number of domains in the
TLD and the number of secure delegations (as an absolute
value and a percentage).
4.2 Collected data
TLD #domains #failed #skipped #queried #queries #auth ns
.com 326504 7416 471 318576 54.6 M 2550
.net 69552 2672 55 66814 11.0 M 2476
.org 37621 555 19 37024 6.7 M 2073
.nl 1696103 12304 1002 1682770 233.3 M 1316
.se 334880 8696 100 326067 43.3 M 3681
.uk 10225 314 10 9894 1.6 M 570
Table 3: Overview of DNSSEC data sets
TLD #domains #failed #skipped #queried #queries #auth ns
.com 498502 55909 2231 436593 37.6 M 72168
.net 99564 13904 355 84882 7.4 M 26396
.org 100000 11031 277 88372 7.5 M 27761
.nl 1000000 69092 6812 921441 69.3 M 31108
.se 499999 37361 149560 311871 21.5 M 23756
.uk 26131 3883 92 21858 1.6 M 7091
Table 4: Overview of non-DNSSEC data sets
We ran two scans for each TLD in the source data set.
The first scan covered all DNSSEC-signed domains in the
TLD. The second scan examined a representative uniformly
random sample of unsigned domains with a size in the same
order of magnitude as the number of DNSSEC-signed do-
mains in the TLD.
For each scan type Tab. 3 and Tab. 4 show the total num-
ber of domains for which queries were attempted, the num-
ber of domains for which we failed to obtain the list of au-
thoritative name servers, the number of domains that were
skipped (because they were DNSSEC-signed whereas they
were expected not to be or vice versa), the actual number
of domains that were successfully queried, the total number
of queries included in the data set and the number of dis-
tinct authoritative name servers observed during the scan.
We note that there may be a slight difference between the
total number of domains for which queries were attempted
(col. 2) and the number of failed, skipped and successfully
queried domains added up (col. 3 + 4 + 5). This is because
for a small number of domains although we were able to de-
termine the set of authoritative name servers none of these
responded to queries. Since for both the regular as well as
the DNSSEC data sets this difference is very small (0.52%
and 0.03% on average over all TLDs respectively) it is not
shown in the table.
4.3 General observations
If we look at the result data sets in Tab. 3 and Tab. 4
three observations stand out.
1. The fraction of domains for which the set of authori-
tative name servers could not be determined is signifi-
cantly larger for unsigned domains (on average 10.9%
for unsigned domains versus 2.3% for DNSSEC-signed
domains). This seems to imply that DNSSEC-signed
domains are generally configured better and are more
likely to have functioning delegations.
2. The ratio of distinct authoritative name servers ver-
sus the number of domains in the data set is much
higher for unsigned domains (by more than a factor of
10). This is probably due to the fact that a number of
large DNS operators enabled DNSSEC for all domains
they manage stimulated by TLDs like .nl, .se and .org
offering financial incentives for deploying DNSSEC.
3. A very high number of domains in the .se TLD were
skipped in the non-DNSSEC data set because they
turned out to be DNSSEC-signed after all; a random
sampling of the skipped domains shows that this is
very likely due to one large DNS operator having en-
abled DNSSEC without creating secure delegations in
the parent TLD.
5. ANALYSIS
5.1 Introduction
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of our mea-
surements and examine the differences between regular and
DNSSEC-signed domains. Rather than looking at the exact
response size in bytes for different queries, we use the ampli-
fication factor as main metric. We do this because it allows
for a non-biased comparison between queries for different
domains independent of the length of the domain name. To
illustrate this with an example, the shortest scanned domain
name in .com is 1 character long; the query size for this do-
main is 34 bytes, the response size for an ANY query with
DNSSEC enabled is 3549 bytes. This gives an amplification
factor of 104.4, which is very high as we will see later. The
query size for the longest name (63 characters) scanned in
.com is 96 bytes and the response size is 3805 bytes. That
only yields an amplification factor of 39.6 (around average
as we will see later). If we had compared these two domains
on the basis of the response size then the second domain
would have been classified as “worse” than the first domain,
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Figure 4: Amplification of ANY queries for .net
whereas in fact it is not. We also note that the amplification
factor more accurately reflects the return on investment for
attackers. A certain amount of traffic n sent by an attacker
results in an attack that is n× amplification in size. Note
that we calculate the amplification factor using the UDP
datagram size for both query and response rather than us-
ing the full packet size. This prevents noise from varying
packet sizes caused by differences in the underlying network
technology.
Another general remark concerns the selection criteria for
the graphs we plot. In most of our analyses, we only in-
clude responses we consider valid, defined as those responses
that include at least one answer in the answer section and
that have a response code (RCODE) that indicates success
(NOERROR). We do this to exclude as many authenticated
denial-of-existence answers as possible from the data sets
used to plot the graphs since these may skew the data in
the graphs (as especially the A and AAAA queries we perform
may result in authenticated denial-of-existence as the name
we query for may not exist). We cover authenticated denial-
of-existence itself in a separate graph, which of course does
include responses with no answers and with response codes
that indicate that the name does not exist.
In our analysis, we look at three areas of interest. First we
examine the main vehicle for DNS amplification attacks, ANY
queries. Next, we look at query types for which we expect
large answers. We finish by examining the bread and butter
of the DNS, address queries.
5.2 ANY amplification increase
Since ANY queries are the most interesting for attackers,
we start our analysis by looking at these in more detail. To
compare the amplification factor that is achievable with an
ANY query for regular domains and DNSSEC-signed domains
we plot this factor for both types of domains in a single
graph. In order to do this, we distribute the data across
bins of size 0.1; plotting the actual data results in a graph
as shown in Fig. 4, which shows the ANY amplification factor
for the .net TLD. As can be seen, graphing the original
data (thin red and blue lines) leads to a jagged graph. This
is due to the fact that the amplification factor is derived
from discrete values (query and response size) resulting in
a bias for certain bins. To mitigate this, we have chosen
to represent the data using a Be´zier curve that follows the
average fill of the bins (thicker cyan and green lines).
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Figure 5: Amplification of ANY queries (all TLDs)
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Figure 6: Examining the two peaks in .nl
The graph in Fig. 5, plotted as described above, com-
pares the ANY amplification factor for all TLDs for which we
performed measurements. Regular domains are represented
by filled grey curves whereas DNSSEC-signed domains are
represented using coloured lines. This approach to plotting
is repeated in all other graphs that compare amplification
of regular versus DNSSEC-signed domains. The vertical
black line (indicated with an arrow) represents the theoret-
ical maximum achievable amplification factor using regular
DNS, which we set as an acceptable upper limit to amplifi-
cation in Sec. 3.2.
Looking at Fig. 5 we see that, as expected, the ampli-
fication factor for DNSSEC-signed domains is significantly
higher than for unsigned domains. On average, the am-
plification for unsigned domains is around 5.9 whereas for
DNSSEC-signed domains the average lies around 47.2 (about
8× higher). We also note that – apart from outliers not vis-
ible in the graph – the amplification factor for ANY queries
for DNSSEC-signed domains always exceeds the acceptable
upper limit we set.
Next, the distribution of the amplification factors observed
is much more spread out for DNSSEC-signed domains. This
is as expected; a DNSSEC-signed answer includes a sepa-
rate signature (RRSIG record) for each resource record set
(all records of a certain type for a name). Thus, the more
different resource record types in an answer the more signa-
tures. Signature records are large (> 150 bytes for a 1024-bit
signature) and contribute significantly to the amplification
factor.
Figure 7: Effect of disabling optional response sec-
tions on ns3.surfnet.nl
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Figure 8: Examining the two peaks in .se
Finally we note that the distribution of amplification fac-
tors for DNSSEC-signed domains shows two peaks for each
TLD, one around 40 and a lower peak around 55. We found
two effects that play a role in this.
The first effect occurs for the majority of the TLDs we
measured (.com, .net, .org, .nl and .uk). For these TLDs,
the two peaks can be explained by looking at the number
of DNSKEY records in the zone. The first peak coincides with
having 2 DNSKEY records in the zone, the second peak co-
incides with having 3 or more DNSKEY records in the zone.
Fig. 6 shows this correlation for the .nl TLD (the blue line in
Fig. 6 corresponds to the data for .nl as graphed in Fig. 5
in orange). Note that we do not have direct data for the
number of DNSKEY records per scanned domain. Rather, we
derive this from the number of answers in the DNSKEY query
for a domain. If this number is 4 or below (red line in Fig. 6),
then there are 2 or less DNSKEYs present (4 answers means 2
DNSKEY records and 2 signatures in the answer, one signature
with each key). If this number is higher than 4 (blue line
in Fig. 6) then there are 3 or more DNSKEYs present. The
reason for having different numbers of DNSKEY records in a
domain is simple: different software implementations that
use different key rollover strategies (a discussion of which is
outside of the scope of this paper, for more information on
DNSSEC key rollovers see e.g. [14]).
The second effect occurs for one TLD (.se) only. Inter-
estingly, in this case the two peaks show no relation to the
number of DNSKEY records. Rather, the peaks are related
to whether or not the additional and authority sections in a
DNS answer are filled. These sections are optional in most
DNS responses (see Sec. 4 of [3]). Most DNS software imple-
mentations have a configuration option that allows adminis-
trators to disable filling of these optional sections of a DNS
answer9. Disabling these optional responses can have a dra-
matic effect on the response size. Fig. 7 shows the change in
average response size (a reduction of ±80%) for an authori-
tative name server. Especially for DNSSEC-signed domains,
the difference in size can be dramatic since signatures will be
included in these optional sections. In Fig. 8 we graphed the
amplification for DNS responses that did not include the op-
tional authority and additional sections (red line), the am-
plification for responses that did include optional sections
(blue line) and the original data for ANY responses in .se
(blue filled curve) corresponding to the brown line in Fig. 5.
5.2.1 Outliers
Fig. 5 shows the distribution in amplification factor for the
majority of domains measured. There are, however, outliers
that have much higher amplification factors. Tab. 5 gives
an overview of the outliers. Per TLD, it shows the number
of domains with an amplification factor higher than 100 as
well as the absolute maximum amplification factor of any
domain measured.
maximum amplification
TLD #amp. > 100 % with DNSSEC w/o DNSSEC
.com 144 (0.05%) 119.2 75.0
.net 168 (0.25%) 178.6 51.0
.org 139 (0.38%) 143.1 33.6
.nl 145 (0.01%) 131.0 80.9
.se 211 (0.06%) 120.0 63.7
.uk 26 (0.26%) 148.6 26.7
Table 5: Outliers per TLD
The table shows some staggering outliers, especially keep-
ing in mind that an amplification factor of 100 means an
attacker can mount an attack of 1Gbit/s by sending only
10Mbit/s. For comparison, the rightmost column of Tab. 5
shows the maximum amplification factor for the unsigned
domains we measured. These are clearly a lot lower, with
none exceeding 80.9.
5.3 Other large queries (DNSKEY, NSEC3,
MX, NS, TXT)
First, we analyse two DNSSEC-specific query types, the
DNSKEY query and authenticated denial-of-existence. As ex-
plained in Sec. 3.4, the answer to a DNSKEY query for a do-
main is likely to be large. Fig. 9 shows the amplification
factor for DNSKEY queries for all TLDs we measured. On av-
erage 37.8% of DNSKEY queries yield an amplification factor
that exceeds the acceptable upper limit we set in Sec. 3.2.
We observe that most TLDs have two peaks in the graph;
this is again caused by varying numbers of DNSKEY records
per domain as described in the analysis of ANY queries in
Sec. 5.2.
The other query type likely to result in large responses
when DNSSEC is used, is a query that has no answer. Just
like in regular DNS, a special response is returned when the
name and/or record type queried for does not exist. The dif-
ference is that in DNSSEC a proof is included that the name
and/or record type does not exist. This is called authen-
ticated denial-of-existence and relies on two special record
9For instance, the popular DNS implementation BIND
has the minimal-responses option, for more information
see ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/cur/9.10/doc/arm/
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Figure 9: Amplification factor of DNSKEY queries
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Figure 10: Amplification factor of authenticated
denial-of-existence
types, NSEC and NSEC3. These record types are two protocol
variants that achieve the same goal. The difference between
the two is that NSEC uses names in proofs whereas NSEC3
uses hash values in proofs (a detailed discussion of the pro-
tocol differences is out of scope for this paper). Depending
on the protocol and the type of proof required a number
of NSEC or NSEC3 records are included in an authenticated
denial-of-existence proof, each accompanied by a signature.
Fig. 10 shows the amplification factor for NSEC(3) responses
for all TLDs measured. As the graph shows, except for some
outliers, the majority of responses fall within the acceptable
upper limit we set. The graph contains multiple peaks for
each TLD. Analysis of the data shows that the peaks are
related to the number of NSEC(3) records in a response.
In Sec. 3.4 on metrics we said that we expected two other
types of queries, the MX and NS query types, to also yield
potentially large answers. Our measurements show, how-
ever, that this is not the case. Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 respec-
tively show a comparison between the amplification factors
we measured for regular domains versus DNSSEC-signed do-
mains for MX and NS queries. As both graphs illustrate, the
increase in amplification is low (between a 2× and 3×) and –
outliers excepted – remains well below the acceptable maxi-
mum upper limit we set in Sec. 3.2. This is in line with other
regular queries that will be discussed in the next section.
Similarly, we discussed that the TXT query type, that is for
instance commonly used to convey information about spam
filtering, is sometime abused by attackers in specially crafted
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Figure 11: Amplification of MX queries
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Figure 12: Amplification of NS queries
domains created to perform DDoS attacks (see Sec. 2.1.3).
Fig. 13 shows the comparison in amplification for TXT queries.
As the graph shows, the majority of responses is below the
acceptable upper limit. We note that for the .nl domain
there is a small peak in responses just beyond the accept-
able upper limit. Closer examination shows that this peak
is caused by authenticated denial-of-existence answers. Re-
call from Sec. 5.1 that we only include responses in the data
set that is plotted that have one or more actual answers
in them. It turns out that the responses that make up this
peak are CNAME responses. In DNS, a CNAME functions like an
alias that refers to another name. The DNS server will at-
tempt to expand a CNAME answer to include the actual record
that the CNAME refers to. If this is not possible (because no
record of the queried type exists) then it will return only
the CNAME answer together with an authenticated denial-of-
existence (NSEC(3)) proof in the authority section of the
response. We examined the data set used to plot Fig. 13
and compared the average number of answers in the author-
ity section for responses both below as well as above the
acceptable upper limit. For responses below the limit there
are about 2.98 answers in the authority section whereas for
responses above the upper limit this number is 7.75. Ex-
amination of a random sample of domains combined with
this information provides a clear indication that this peak is
caused by authenticated denial-of-existence answers related
to CNAME expansion. We repeated this analysis for the other
TLDs and saw a similar pattern albeit with peaks at slightly
lower amplification factors (between 15 and 20).
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Figure 13: Amplification of TXT queries
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Figure 14: Amplification of A queries
5.4 Regular queries (A, AAAA)
We end with queries for the IPv4 (A) and IPv6 (AAAA) ad-
dresses of a name, which are the bread and butter of DNS.
We start with the first, A queries. Fig. 14 shows the compar-
ison in amplification factor between regular and DNSSEC-
signed domains. As the graph shows, the vast majority of re-
sponses to A queries is well below the acceptable upper limit
defined in Sec. 3.2. Generally speaking, the increase in am-
plification for DNSSEC-signed domains is between 2× and
4×. We examined the higher amplification factors, above
12.5 present in the graph, to find out why these responses are
larger. We believe that this is caused by a configuration dif-
ference in the name servers. Responses with an amplification
factor above 12.5 include significantly more answers in the
authority and additional section (3.90 and 3.46 for responses
with amplification > 12.5, 0.16 and 0.02 for responses with
amplification < 12.5). This indicates that answers with an
amplification > 12.5 come from name servers that fill the
optional authority and additional sections, whereas answers
with a lower amplification come from name servers config-
ured to give minimal responses (see also Sec. 5.2).
Fig. 15 shows the situation for AAAA queries. The graph
shows strong similarities with the graph for TXT records, with
the majority of responses falling within the acceptable upper
limit and with a small peak for the .nl domain just beyond
the upper limit around an amplification factor of 26. Re-
peating the analysis we applied to TXT and A records shows
that the cause of this peak is the same as for TXT records,
namely authenticated denial-of-existence answers for CNAME
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Figure 15: Amplification of AAAA queries
expansions. Again, this also proved to be the case for the
other TLDs which have a similar peak around the somewhat
lower amplification factor of 18.
6. COUNTERMEASURES
In Sec. 5 we showed that certain queries for DNSSEC-
signed domains yield amplification factors that allow attack-
ers to attain high attack volumes with a relatively small
investment in bandwidth on their side. In this section we
discuss a number of mitigation strategies to address this
problem.
6.1 Ingress filtering
The root cause of any type of amplification attack is at-
tackers having the ability to spoof source IP addresses in
connectionless protocols (e.g. UDP). This problem has been
known for a long time and the obvious solution is to stop
source address spoofing. The solution is known as ingress
filtering and is described in BCP 38 [15]. The basic premise
behind ingress filtering is that network operators only allow
traffic to enter their network if the source IP address is a
legitimate address within their network. Although this so-
lution is highly effective, it only works if deployed Internet-
wide. Unfortunately, that is not the case. NPS runs a
project that measures deployment of BCP 3810. Although
their statistics indicate that the majority of networks imple-
ment ingress filtering, a large number still do not, making
this mitigation strategy ineffective.
6.2 Response Rate Limiting
As mentioned briefly in Sec. 2.2, Response Rate Limiting
(RRL) was introduced in 2012 after a slew of DNS ampli-
fication attacks that abused DNSSEC-signed domains. The
idea behind RRL is that authoritative name servers rate
limit outgoing responses, when responses to the same query
are sent repeatedly to the same IP block11. At first glance,
RRL can significantly dampen the impact of DNS ampli-
fication attacks. A closer examination, however, shows a
number of problems:
• RRL only works for authoritative name servers; since
most attacks do not directly use authoritative name
10http://spoofer.cmand.org/summary.php
11A detailed discussion of RRL by its designer can be
found at http://ss.vix.su/~vixie/isc-tn-2012-1.txt
servers but instead abuse open DNS resolvers (see also
Sec. 2.1) its mitigating effect is limited. Especially if an
attack uses queries that are cached by an open resolver,
RRL on the authoritative name server for the domain
abused for the attack will have little or no effect.
• As Paul Vixie’s memorandum on RRL11 mentions in
Sec. 5, attackers can craft an attack that circumvents
RRL by using a spread of queries in the attack rather
than one single query.
• RRL can affect legitimate queries. Resolvers that do
not (properly) cache results will suffer from RRL, which
results in service degradation for clients behind these
resolvers. Additionally, RRL can be turned into a
denial-of-service weapon. By flooding authoritative
name servers that use RRL with queries in which the
source address is spoofed to be that of a legitimate re-
solver (e.g. the resolver of a large ISP) this legitimate
resolver can experience service degradation in resolv-
ing specific queries on the authoritative name server
under attack.
Thus, although RRL can certainly play a role in mitiga-
tion, it is not the definitive solution to name servers being
abused for DNS amplification attacks.
6.3 EDNS0 cookies
Before EDNS0 was introduced the potential for ampli-
fication attacks using DNS was limited by the hard up-
per response size limit of 512 bytes. As we have shown
in Sec. 2.1.2, EDNS0 is now in wide-spread use across the
Internet. Because it allows for much larger responses, DNS
amplification attacks have gained much more potential. As
mentioned before, the root cause that allows for these at-
tacks is source address spoofing. A potential solution to this
is some form of source address authentication, that allows
the recipient of a packet to establish that the source ad-
dress has not been spoofed. An effective way to implement
this is by using cookies, as proposed by Eastlake in [16]. In
short, the idea is that a name server does not send large
responses to a client using EDNS0 unless the client proves
its authenticity using an authentication cookie established
during an initial interaction between client and server. We
believe that this can be a particularly effective solution to
the DNS amplification attack problem.
6.4 Response size limiting
Another mitigation strategy is to limit the size of DNS
responses such that no answer exceeds the acceptable upper
limit for amplification we set in Sec. 3.2. The results of our
analysis in Sec. 5 show that doing this would not affect most
regular queries, but would probably only impact ANY queries.
A beneficial side effect of this mitigation strategy is that it
also prevents IP fragmentation of DNS responses, which is a
serious stability problem affecting DNSSEC-signed domains,
as described in [17]. If applied, DNS responses over UDP
are restricted to a certain maximum size. Answers exceeding
that size result in truncated DNS responses, forcing clients
to retry the query over TCP. This effectively stops attackers
from using responses larger than the chosen maximum size
as TCP is connection-oriented and thus immune to source
address spoofing.
6.5 Restricting or blocking ANY queries
The biggest amplification problem – if we do not consider
crafted domains – is ANY queries. This begs the question
whether this query type should be severely restricted or even
blocked. Restricting ANY queries can be done using response
size limiting (Sec. 6.4) and is automatically done by RRL
(Sec. 6.2). A more extreme measure would be to block ANY
queries altogether. This can only be done, however, if no
legitimate use cases depend on ANY queries. We know, how-
ever, that certain software, such as qmail12, uses ANY queries.
Blocking ANY queries might thus affect some legitimate users.
Assessing the full impact of blocking ANY queries is out-
side the scope of this work but definitely warrants further
investigation. We note that – just like RRL – blocking ANY
queries is not a complete solution as other query types, such
as DNSKEY queries, can still result in a significant amount of
amplification.
7. RELATED WORK
Geva et al. [18] discuss DDoS attacks in a general sense.
They performed simulations that illustrate the damage that
attacks can cause and describe a spectrum of different DDoS
attack mechanisms and various mitigation strategies against
these attacks. They conclude that many defense mechanisms
are problematic to deploy and that they may struggle to pro-
tect against the increasing threat level of today. A similar,
but more practical and elaborate overview of DDoS attacks
and defense mechanisms is given by Zargar et al. [19].
On the measurement side, Casalicchio et al. [20] describe
a highly detailed reference architecture for measuring the
stability and security of the DNS. They argue that the DNS
is the most important infrastructure underpinning the In-
ternet and that there is a great need to assess the health of
the DNS on a continuous basis.
Rossow [21] performed measurements for 14 protocols that
can be abused for amplification attacks. Where we focus on
DNSSEC, Rossow covers amplification in its breadth. For
DNS, Rossow considers amplification through open resolvers
and directly abusing authoritative name servers. In the lat-
ter category he examines ANY queries for DNSSEC-signed
domains. We corresponded with him and his data set covers
25K domains distributed over more than 70 TLDs. Rossow
finds ANY amplification factors in the same range as we do,
although the outliers in our data set exceed his findings and
the distribution of amplification factors differs. We believe
that this difference in distribution can be explained by the
difference in sample size and composition; we use a much
larger sample in which groups of domains hosted by a single
operator may dominate. If such an operator has configured
their servers such that they are less amenable to amplifica-
tion then this will be reflected in the distribution of ampli-
fication factors in our results.
Highly relevant is work by Anagnostopoulos et al. [22].
They also perform extensive measurements to assess the po-
tential impact of DNS amplification attacks. Where their
work differs from our approach is that they focus on open
resolvers. They measure numbers of open resolvers for three
European countries and assess their capabilities (i.e. what
amplification factor can be achieved by abusing them). This
makes their work complementary to our study.
12http://fanf.livejournal.com/122220.html
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We set out to answer the question how bad DNSSEC re-
ally makes DNS amplification. The simple conclusion from
our measurements is that it is quite bad. If we only consider
ANY queries, then DNSSEC-signed domains yield high ampli-
fication factors, averaging between 40 and 55. This exceeds
the average amplification of regular DNS by a factor of 6×-
12×. Looking deeper, however, the picture is more nuanced.
For many common DNS queries, using DNSSEC results in
larger responses but the amplification factor mostly stays
within the acceptable upper limit (based on the maximum
amplification of classic DNS) set in Sec. 3.2. Nevertheless,
an attacker needs only one or a few domains with large am-
plification factors, and by carefully choosing a signed do-
main attackers can achieve significant amplification using
e.g. DNSKEY queries. It is clear then that this needs to be
addressed, both by mitigating the risk of carrying out a
successful amplification attack as well as by improving the
DNSSEC protocol, for instance by using cryptographic sig-
nature schemes with more favourable key and signature sizes
that reduce the size of DNSSEC responses, such as ellip-
tic curve digital signatures (ECDSA) [23]. We also bring
back to mind that attacks with large amplification factors
were already feasible without DNSSEC. Attackers already
use crafted domains and can continue to do so regardless of
whether DNSSEC is implemented. DNSSEC does, however,
give attackers more options, such as directly abusing author-
itative name servers instead of open resolvers and foregoing
the use of crafted domains.
There are a number of countermeasures that can be de-
ployed to mitigate the effect of DNS amplification attacks.
The first two we discussed (BCP 38 and RRL) are already in
active (albeit not universal) use. The other three, however,
require further work. We consider EDNS0 cookies to be a
particularly promising strategy for combating DNS amplifi-
cation attacks but note that work on this approach is still
at an early stage. We intend to investigate the effectiveness
of this approach in a future project. Response size limiting,
also requires more study. Before such a solution can become
a recommended best practice the impact of this approach
on legitimate DNS traffic will need to be assessed to ensure
that it does not adversely affect DNS functionality. We have
already looked at this on a small scale while working on [17]
but a more extensive assessment is required. Blocking ANY
queries, finally, also warrants further investigation as it may
be a good stopgap measure against the worst amplification
attacks. We note again, however, that it is certainly not
a panacea as other query types can still lead to significant
amplification.
As mentioned in Sec. 3.5, we will share the data sets re-
sulting from our measurements as open data and do so on
http://traces.simpleweb.org.
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